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Rule Making Function of California
Administrative Agencies
By J. ALBERT HUTCHINSON*
IN keeping with the scope of this series of papers, we will outline
some fundamental considerations of California administrative law re-
lated to the rule making or quasi-legislative function of the licensing
officers and bodies of the state, primarily as controlled by those sections
of the Administrative Procedure Act1 (A.P.A.) providing procedural
principles for the adoption of administrative rules and regulations.2
Our examination will be restricted to the state-wide licensing agencies
created by general legislative enactment in the several codes, initiative
enactments and constitutional provisions of this state." Consideration
of rule making functions of the agencies operating under the acts of
Congress is, therefore, omitted and local activities in this field are
noted elsewhere in this issue.4
Definitions
Rule making, or the adoption of administrative regulations, in this
field of governmental activity has been called quasi-legislative. This
means, pragmatically, the interpretation, definition and further speci-
* LL.B., Hastings College of the Law, 1931; member, San Francisco Bar.
" CAL. GoV. CODE §§ 11370-528.2 CAL. GOV. CODE §§ 11371-440.
3 The A.P.A. necessarily eliminates both federal agencies and local agencies operat-
ing under the "home-rule" provisions of article XI of the California Constitution and
expressly limits its coverage. See CAL. GoV. CODE §§ 11371(a): "'State agency' does
not include an agency in the judicial or legislative departments of the State Govern-
ment." CAL. GoV. CODE § 11445: "Articles 4 and 5 of this chapter shall not apply to
the Public Utilities Commission or the Industrial Accident Commission, and Articles 2
and 3 of this chapter shall apply only to the rules of procedure of said state agencies."
Further, CAL. Gov. CODE §§ 11380(a), (b) provide that no filing need be made for any
regulation which: "(1) Establishes or fixes rates, prices or tariffs. (2) Relates to the
use of public works. ... (3) Is directed to a specifically named person or to a group
of persons and does not apply generally throughout the State."
4 Dietz, Local Adaptation of the California Administrative Procedure Act, 15 HAs-
TwnGs L.J.-(1964) (this issue).
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fication of legislative declarations of policy having general application
to all persons similarly situated, as contrasted with the particular ap-
plication of such legislative policies (independently, or as refined by
interpretative regulation) to specific past transactions factually estab-
lished. In short, administrative rules apply generally and prospectively
to all transactions within their scope, as does legislation, whereas ad-
ministrative adjudication like judicial adjudication applies only to es-
tablished fact situations.5
Secondly, as used in the present context, such rules directly affect
persons subject to the legislation as contrasted with "housekeeping"
regulations not directly affecting "outsiders."
The A.P.A. specifically avoids delegating or conferring additional
or independent authority to adopt rules upon the affected agencies. It
only defines the procedural requirements for adoption of rules in ac-
cordance with legislative delegations found in acts creating such agen-
cies and defining their general powers. Hence the basic substantive
authority for a particular rule must be found in the enabling statute or
other source.7
5 See Aylward v. State Board of Chiropractic Examiners, 31 Cal 2d 833, 192 P.2d
929 (1948), in respect to the possibility of "administrative res judicata."
6 CAL. Gov. CODE § 11422(b).
The Act defines such quasi-legislative action in § 11371(b), (c):
(b) "Regulation" means every rule, regulation, order, or standard of gen-
eral application or the amendment, supplement or revision of any such rule,
regulation, order or standard adopted by any state agency to implement, inter-
pret, or make specific the law enforced or administered by it, or to govern its
procedure except one which relates only to the internal management of the state
agencies. "Regulation" does not mean or include any form prescribed by a
state agency or any instructions relating to the use of the form, but this pro-
vision is not a limitation upon any requirement that a regulation be adopted
pursuant to this part when one is needed to implement the law under which
the form is issued.
(c) "Order of repeal" means any resolution, order or other official act
of a state agency which expressly repeals a regulation in whole or in part.
7 CAL. GOV. CODE § 11373:
Except as provided in section 11409, nothing in this chapter confers au-
thority upon or augments the authority of any state agency to adopt, admin-
ister, or enforce any regulation. Each regulation adopted to be effective, must
be within the scope of authority conferred and in accordance with standards
prescribed by other provisions of law.
CAL. Gov. CODE § 11374:
Whenever by the express or implied terms of any statute a state agency
has authority to adopt regulations to implement, interpret, make specific or
otherwise carry out the' provisions of the statute, no regulation adopted is valid
or effective unless consistent and not in conflict with the statute and reasonably
necessary to effectuate the purpose of the statute.
Any existing rules or regulations conflicting with this section are hereby
repealed.
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Procedural Requirements in Rule Making
Historically, public officers and public bodies have always exer-
cised what has lately come to be known as rule making or quasi-legis-
lative power, from the beginning of government through legislative
act. Every statute, ordinance and congressional act inevitably calls for
interpretation in application and such interpretation must, as a prag-
matic necessity, be accomplished by the official body charged with
enforcement of the legislation." In earlier times such interpretations
were not reflected in any established record or even formal rules, and
procedural requirements and restrictions upon administrative rule
making were unknown. In this connection it will be recalled that the
California legislature did not generally require that the rules or regu-
lations of state administrative agencies be formalized or registered
anywhere until the adoption of the amendments to the Government
Code to this end.9 In order to implement such notoriety as could be
accomplished by filing existing rules with the Secretary of State, the
statute further provided that any rule not so filed would be deemed
repealed. Even this modest beginning was rendered ineffectual until
1943 by the absence of appropriation for the codification and indexing
of such rules created by the 1941 legislation.1 At that time there was
no provision for publication of such rules as so filed and most admin-
istrative agencies did not make the rules adopted by them generally
available to the public and to the persons directly affected in any
usable form.
The Judicial Council in its definitive study of administrative fact
finding and adjudicative procedures did not reach the subject of rule
making and made no recommendation for specific legislation on the
subject of administrative rule making." However, the council did rec-
ommend establishment of a procedural agency to continue the study
of administrative agencies in response to which the legislature created
the Division of Administrative Procedure in the Department of Busi-
ness and Professional Standards.' 2
Presently, the basic and generally applicable requirements in the
rule making function are set forth in sections 11420 through 11427 of
the A.P.A.'8 In each instance, the adoption procedure must also con-
8 See Bank of Italy Natl Trust & Say. Ass'n v. Johnson, 7 Cal. App. 2d 463, 46
P.2d 244 (1935).
9 Cal. Stat. 1941, ch. 628.1o Cal. Stat. 1943, ch. 1060.
11 TENTH BIENNIAL REPORT, JUDIcIAL CouNcIL OF CALiFomriA (1944).
12 Cal. Stat. 1945, chs. 111, 1134; Cal. Stat. 1947, chs. 1175, 1425.
'1 CA.L. Gov. CODE § 11420:
It is the purpose of this article to establish basic minimum procedural re-
quirements for the adoption, amendment or repeal of administrative regula-
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form to any requirements of the substantive statute as well as to
the Act.
The procedural requirements are primarily designed for the exer-
cise of authority, delegated by substantive statutes, to "fill in the
blanks" by the adoption of rules refining and applying such legislation,
by the adoption of standards, and similar implementations of declared
legislative policy. In the main, such substantive statutes are in exercise
of the police power, but include the administration of benefits, taxa-
tion and other items of government interest. The provisions governing
rule making do not contemplate administrative interpretation, as con-
trasted with implementation, of such substantive enactments, although,
in practice, many rules appear designed only to spell out the adminis-
trative construction and interpretation of statutes. Conformance to
the registration and procedural requirements of the Act in this context
is in the public interest in giving publicity to such administrative in-
terpretations, avoidance of uninformed declarations of administrative
policy and the like. It must be recalled, however, that administrative
construction of statutes is permissible and effectual only where the
"construed" statute is uncertain, ambiguous or incomplete in statement
and will be disregarded if the meaning of the statute is clear.'4
Judicial Review of Administrative Rule Making
Rule making actions, formal and informal, are frequently chal-
lenged in license proceedings before the adopting agency and are re-
viewed in connection with the order made upon the administrative
findings under section 1094.5 of the Code of Civil Procedure.' 5 As
hereinafter noted, review by proceedings for a writ of mandate is gen-
erally inappropriate.
The only provision for judicial review of administrative rule mak-
ing contained in the Act is found in section 11440.16 In the relatively
tions. Except as provided in section 11421, the provisions of this article are
applicable to the exercise of any quasi-legislative power conferred by any
statute heretofore or hereafter enacted, but nothing in this article repeals or
diminishes additional requirements imposed by any such statute. The provi-
sions of this article shall not be superseded or modified by any subsequent leg-
islation except to the extent that such legislation shall do so expressly.
14 See Louis Stores, Inc. v. Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control, 57 Cal. 2d
749, 22 Cal. Rptr. 14, 371 P.2d 758 (1962), and cases cited.
15 See Duskin v. State Bd. of Dry Cleaners, 58 Cal. 2d 155, 158, 166, 23 Cal. Rptr.
404, 373 P.2d 468 (1962).
16 CAL. Gov. CoDE § 11440:
Any interested person may obtain a judicial declaration as to the validity
of any regulation by bringing an action for declaratory relief in the superior
court in accordance with the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure and in
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short time since the enactment of this provision of the Act, the scope
of judicial review has not been fully delineated by decisional rulings
upon standing to litigate, litigable interest in the rule under challenge,
and the elements, or test, of a justiciable issue under this provision of
the Act. Because the latter section expressly assimilates the provisions
of the Code of Civil Procedure for declaratory judgment,1 it appears
the principles applicable to declaratory relief in other situations will
be applied to review of administrative rule making.' 8
The Supreme Court first considered section 11440 in Chas. L. Har-
ney, Inc. v. Contractors' State License Board 9 and made it clear that
a licensee within the ambit of the statute implemented by the rule
was entitled to a declaratory judgment upon a minimal factual show-
ing. The regulation involved was a classification of specialty contrac-
tors, as provided by sections of the Business and Professions Code. The
classification of the specialty contractors was not challenged; however,
the regulation provided in effect that the activity of a specialized clas-
sification could not be carried on by a contractor who had not been
qualified in such specialty. Harney was a general contractor and, it
was conceded, could lawfully undertake a contract for the construction
of an entire project embracing the field of activity of many specialties.
The question presented was whether the classification rule properly
prevented Harney from undertaking a contract to perform the work
of a special classification, independent of a general contract under his
general contractor's license.
The trial court had granted a judgment on the pleadings on the
theory that Harney had not presented a justiciable issue since he had
not claimed he even desired to undertake any specialty contract. The
supreme court reversed, stating in part:
As we have seen, plaintiff as an interested party is entitled under
section 11440 of the Government Code to obtain a judicial declara-
tion as to the validity of rule 732 in accordance with the provisions of
section 1060 of the Code of Civil Procedure which specifically author-
izes a declaration of rights or duties "before there has been any
breach of the obligation in respect to which said declaration is
sought." . . . The Legislature, by enactment of section 11440, must
addition to any other ground which may exist, such regulation may be declared
to be invalid for a substantial failure to comply with the provisions of this
chapter or, in the case of an emergency regulation or order of repeal, upon
the ground that the facts recited in the statement do not constitute an emer-
gency within the provisions of section 11421(b).
17 CAL. CODE CIV. PRoc. §§ 1060-62a.
'
8 Duke Molner Wholesale Liquor Co. v. Martin, 180 Cal. App. 2d 873, 4 Cal.
Rptr. 904 (1960).
19 39 Cal. 2d 561, 247 P.2d 913 (1952).
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have intended to permit persons affected by an administrative regu-
lation to test its validity without having to enter into contracts with
third persons in violation of its terms or to subject themselves to prose-
cution or disciplinary proceedings. (See Div. of Adm. Proc., 3d Bi-
ennial Report [19511 p. 18.)
Since the complaint is legally sufficient and sets forth facts and
circumstances showing that a declaratory adjudication is appropriate,
it was error for the trial court to enter a judgment for defendants on
the pleadings.
20
The full impact of the decision is pointed up by the minority
opinion:
To allow Harney by its present pleading to obtain a determination
as to the validity of the rule of the administrative agency in effect
provides a convenient method for securing an advisory opinion from
this court. This is beyond the scope of the statute and contrary to
established judicial procedure.21
In view of the more recent rulings of the California Supreme
Court22 it appears that a licensee may secure a declaration if he is a
licensee subject to the license statute and would be affected by a rule
refining the statute, and he is not, at least, required to allege conduct
which has placed his license in jeopardy. Although it seems estab-
lished that such a declaratory proceeding is not available to "review"
an administrative adjudication, 23 there is no objection to joining a
request for judicial review of administrative fact flnding24 with a cause
of action for a declaratory judgment in the same complaint.
According to the general rule, an association of licensees2 has no
standing to litigate issues arising under statutes and administrative in-
20 Id., at 564-65, 247 P.2d at 915.
21 Id., at 565, 247 P.2d at 915.
22 Zeitlin v. Arnebergh, 59 Cal. 2d 901, 31 Cal. Rptr. 800, 383 P.2d 152 (1963).
23 Hostetter v. Alderson, 38 Cal. 2d 499, 500, 241 P.2d 230 (1952).
24 CAL. CODE Civ. PRoc. § 1094.5. See International Ass'n of Firefighters v. City
of Palo Alto, 60 A.C. 246, 253, 32 Cal. Rptr. 842, 384 P.2d 170 (1963). Presently
pending are two actions seeking such varieties of relief, in the alternative: Keller St.
Development Co. v. Department of Investment, 1 Civil No. 21,365, and Savelli v. Board
of Medical Examiners, 1 Civil No. 21,492.
25 Such an association was joined as a co-plaintiff with Harney. A demurrer was
sustained as to the association, but this ruling was not reserved in the case (Chas. L.
Harney, Inc. v. Contractors' State License Board, 39 Cal. 2d 561, 247 P.2d 913 (1952).
No definite ruling on the precise point in relation to a license situation under section
11440 has been noticed.
It has been common practice (both before and after the adoption of the Act) for
associations of licensees to petition for rules and to participate in proceedings upon the
consideration of rules proposed by other persons. Compare Duke Molner Wholesale
Liquor Co. v. Martin, 180 Cal. App. 2d 763, 4 Cal. Rptr. 904 (1960).
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terpretations of statutes applicable to its members. 26 Nevertheless it
would appear that such associations would have standing to prosecute
an action under A.P.A. section 11440 if they participated in the admin-
istrative proceedings, in view of the language of sections 11423-27
of the Act and the general rule that a litigant qualified to initiate an
administrative proceeding has standing to seek review of the adminis-
trative decision.27
Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies
The Act does not require the pursuit or exhaustion of administra-
tive remedies, if any be available, as a condition to the judicial review
of administrative rules. Section 11440 of the Act, the declaratory judg-
ment provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, and the decisions of
the reviewing courts dealing with section 11440 negative the applica-
tion in this field of the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative rem-
edies as a condition to judicial review. Moreover, there is, generally
speaking, no administrative "remedy" to be invoked in the usual situa-
tion, although an affected person would be free to petition for amend-
ment or repeal of the questioned rule.28
The adoption of the exhaustion principle would appear unsound
and the likely result unfortunate. Usually, the affected person would
have no actual knowledge of the rule, or that it affected him, in ad-
vance of the invocation of the rule in respect to his particular matter
or interest. This situation would generally be true in the case of a
rule applying conditions to admission to licensure or other privilege
where a new applicant seeks to qualify long after the rule had been
adopted. 29 In addition, the adoption of the principle would have the
effect of impelling litigation by each interested person to test all ques-
tioned rules upon their adoption with a resultant increase in the case
load in the trial courts.
Notice should be taken, however, of the case of People v. Coit
Ranch, Inc.8 0
2. Associated Boat Indus. v. Marshall, 104 Cal. App. 2d 21, 23, 230 P.2d 379
(1951).
2z See Covert v. State Bd. of Equalization, 29 Cal. 2d 125, 130, 173 P.2d 545
(1946). Compare Pitts v. Perluss, 58 Cal. 2d 824, 828-29, 27 Cal. Rptr. 19, 377 P.2d
83 (1962). The latter decision suggests that status as a citizen or taxpayer may suffice
to satisfy the condition of a litigible interest in the plaintiff in relation to a rule (22
CAL. AuM. CODE §§ 3254-1 to 3254(i)-2) adopted under the Unemployment Insurance
Code sections 3254(i), 3257 and 3270.
28 CAL. GoV. CODE §§ 11424-26.
29Compare Duskin v. State Bd. of Dry Cleaners, 58 Cal. 2d 155, 23 Cal. Rptr.
404, 373 P.2d 468 (1962).
20 204 Cal. App. 2d 52, 21 Cal. Rptr. 875 (1962). See discussion in text at foot-
note 42.
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Scope of Review
The scope of review of the factual showing in support of the ad-
ministrative rule cannot be said to have been fully delineated by the
decisions of the reviewing courts.
In the nature of things, it is clear that the "evidence" which may
be received before the administrative agency need not qualify as evi-
dence admissible in judicial proceedings; and there is no express lim-
itation upon receipt or use of evidence in quasi-legislative proceedings
as is provided in the provisions of the Act dealing with fact finding
proceedings 31 nor has a direct holding that a rule may not be sup-
portedby hearsay alone been noted. The provisions for receipt of evi-
dence and argument appear in section 11425.
In earlier cases the supreme court made it clear that the courts
would not weigh the evidence before the administrative agency. In
Ray v. Parker32 the court overruled the contention that evidence gath-
ered by the agency's investigators and experts was received and relied
upon in adopting the milk control and pricing rules. In Pitts v. Per-
luss,3s the court reviewed the cases to date and summarized the appli-
cable rules of decision as follows:
We conclude that in determining whether the director has acted
arbitrarily or capriciously, this court does not inquire whether, if it
had power to draft the regulation, it would have adopted some
method or formula other than that promulgated by the director. The
court does not substitute its judgment for that of the administrative
body. The rendition of this regulation involved "highly technical
matters requiring the assistance of skilled and trained experts and
economists and the gathering and study of large amounts of statistical
data and information." (Ray v. Parker, supra, 15 Cal. 2d 275, 311.)
Under such circumstances, "courts should let administrative boards
and officers work out their problems with as little judicial interference
as possible." (Ray v. Parker, supra.) The substitution of the judgment
of a court for that of the administrator in quasi-legislative matters
would effectuate neither the legislative mandate nor sound social
policy.
It is doubted that the factual support for a particular rule may be
reviewed in a manner or degree different from the "review" of statutes
alleged to be unsupported by facts open to consideration by a legis-
lative body.84
3 1 CAL. GOV. CODE § 11513(C).
32,15 Cal. 2d 275, 310-11, 101 P.2d 665 (1940).
33 58 Cal. 2d 824, 834-35, 27 Cal. Rptr. 19, 25-26, 377 P.2d 83, 89-90 (1962).
34 See Blumenthal v. Board of Medical Examiners, 57 Cal. 2d 228, 234-35, 18 Cal.
Rptr. 501, 368 P.2d 101 (1962), and cases cited, which said in part:
We do not believe that the Legislature could reasonably have concluded
that training as a dispensing optician acquired in a physician's office, in a
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It has been held that parties interested in quasi-legislative pro-
ceedings may not complain of denial of procedural due process because
the administrative agency refused other participants the opportunity
of inspection of factual data considered by it in adopting tax rates.3 5
It thus eventuates that the opportunities for the review of factual
support of administrative rule making, in the light of general pre-
sumptions are virtually nonexistent-unless there is no possibility of
factual support in any conceivable circumstance.
This leaves for examination the other considerations to be judi-
cially determined in actions challenging the validity of administrative
rules.
In general, it may be said that in the judicial review of adminis-
trative rules the courts will take into account 30 all the considerations
examined in reviewing statutes, such as constitutionality, permissible
interpretations and the like. In addition, the court will consider the
ambiguity or uncertainty of the statute sought to be implemented by
the rule, whether the delegation is too broad, i.e., without adequate
standards, or is otherwise improper, and will apply the express limita-
tions of the A.P.A. 7 While section 11440 provides that a rule "may
college, university, or other educational institution, in the armed services, or
in another state not requiring a license of persons dispensing optical goods,
would tend to perpetuate the ethical abuses that have prevailed in this pro-
fession, and that such training acquired as an apprentice in a licensed dis-
pensing establishment, or experience acquired by virtue of having been licensed
in another state, would lead to the elimination of these abuses. There is a com-
plete absence of any relationship between the experience requirements sought
to be imposed and the legislative effort to correct ethical abuses in the
profession ...
The conclusion is inescapable that the experience necessary to qualify
a person to dispense optical goods, whatever level of expertise is demanded,
is obtainable in a variety of ways. By prescribing that such experience may be
obtained in only two ways, neither of which may reasonably be thought to be
superior to others, subdivision (a) contravenes the constitutional requirement
that regulatory legislation avoid arbitrary and unreasonable classifications.
See also: Accounting Corp. of America v. State Bd. of Accountancy, 34 Cal. 2d 186,
208 P.2d 984 (1949); State Bd. of Dry Cleaners v. Thrift-D-Lux Cleaners, Inc., 40 Cal
2d 436, 254 P.2d 29 (1953).
35 Franchise Tax Bd. v. Superior Court, 36 Cal. 2d 538, 225 P.2d 905 (1950).
36 See the annotations to section 11440 in the republication of the Act prepared by
the Office of Administrative Procedure, Department of General Services, 1963, at
page 20.
37 CAL. GoV. CODE § 11373-74:
11373. Each regulation adopted, to be effective, must be within the
scope of authority conferred and in accordance with standards prescribed by
other provisions of law.
11374. Whenever by the express or implied terms of any statute a state
agency has authority to adopt regulations to implement, interpret, make specific
or otherwise carry out the provisions of the statute, no regulation adopted is
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be declared invalid for a substantial failure to comply with the pro-
visions of this chapter" no definitive ruling of invalidity on this ground
has been noticed.
Notwithstanding the express "repeal" of "conflicting" rules,3s many
of the licensing agencies have continued, amended and readopted rules
antedating the enactment of the Act, without conforming to the pro-
cedural requirements of the Act. For example, many licensing agencies
have been delegated the authority to "approve" courses of study,
schools of instruction, and the like. Some of such "approval" actions,
positive and negative, were taken years or even decades before the
1941 "repeal" and subsequent enactment of the Act, but continue to
be applied without "complying" with the Act.39
One of the difficulties in judicial review of administrative rules is
that, more often than otherwise, the review of rule making is indirect
and incidental to the review of administrative fact finding proceedings
wherein the administrative determination, either express or by impli-
cation, effectuates an administrative rule, interpretation or implemen-
tation which is neither registered nor adopted in accordance with the
Act.40
In People v. Coit Ranch,41 the plaintiff brought an action to enforce
collection of advertising assessments under a marketing order of the
Director of Agriculture. The applicable code provided for the content
of marketing orders and provided that such orders should contain "no
other provisions than those specified by category and effect." Not-
withstanding, the particular marketing order contained a provision for
a "petition for hearing" before the director respecting any action taken
under the order.
In the enforcement action the trial court found as a fact that the
advertising program which was to be financed with the assessments
sought to be collected, consisted in material part of false and mislead-
ing statements (elsewhere subject to prosecution as crimes). Although
the trial court found the purpose of such assessments was payment for
such false and misleading advertising, the defendant was denied relief
on the ground that the marketing order (without statutory authority)
provided for an atypical and unauthorized "review" by the delegatee
valid or effective unless consistent and not in conflict with the statute and
reasonably necessary to effectuate the purpose of the statute....
38 Cal. Stat. 1941, ch. 628; CAL. GoV. CODE §§ 11374, 11383.
39 Compare Akopiantz v. Board of Medical Examiners, 190 Cal. App. 2d 81, 11
Cal. Rptr. 810 (1961).
40 Compare Duskin v. State Bd. of Dry Cleaners, 58 Cal. 2d 155, 23 Cal. Rptr.
404, 373 P.2d 468 (1962).
41204 Cal. App. 2d 52, 21 Cal. Rptr. 875 (1962).
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of the Director of Agriculture of the order approving the false adver-
tising program.
This is the first instance of a denial of a valid defense on the
ground of failure to exhaust administrative remedies as condition to
judicial review of administrative rule making. In this connection it
should be noted that the "administrative remedy" was not provided
by statute-but only as an unauthorized provision in the marketing
order itself.42
It is doubted that the dilatory plea of failure to exhaust an admin-
istrative remedy, actually extant, will be generally accepted as a means
of avoiding judicial review of administrative rules under section 11440.
It would seem that a qualified litigant would be accorded an appro-
priate declaration without regard to, even in respect to, the validity
of the rule-and, in all events, in respect to the unauthorized admin-
istrative "remedy" itself.
The final, and most important, function of judicial review of ad-
ministrative rule making is the determination of "constitutionality" of
the legislative-administrative regulatory scheme. Actually, a rule can-
not be "unconstitutional." An invalid "rule" is simply ultra vires, un-
authorized and void. However, an application of a statute by a rule
or otherwise which violates constitutional limitations renders the stat-
ute unconstitutional and, if the statute does not by its terms prescribe
the challenged interpretation, or application, the statute is constitu-
tionally defective in lacking adequate standards for the control of the
attempted delegation of an administrative authority.4a
42 Compare Duskin v. State Bd. of Dry Cleaners, 58 Cal. 2d 155, 23 Cal. Rptr.
404, 373 P.2d 468 (1962); Blumenthal v. Board of Medical Examiners, 57 Cal. 2d 228,
18 Cal. Rptr. 501, 368 P.2d 101 (1962), and cases cited.
43 See Duskin v. State Bd. of Dry Cleaners, 58 Cal. 2d 155, 23 Cal. Rptr. 404, 373
P.2d 468 (1962); Blumenthal v. Board of Medical Examiners, 57 Cal. 2d 228, 18 Cal.
Rptr. 501, 368 P.2d 101 (1962).
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